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Introduction
The study of how and why firms get started has a rich tradition in the economics literature. Knight (1971) views an entrepreneur as someone who accepts production risk in exchange for the authority to direct other factors of production; this view is essentially static and helps identify entrepreneurial activity with the risk characteristics of the population. Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) view an entrepreneur as someone who bears risk and receives the reward for the risk. Schumpeter (1949) thinks of the entrepreneur as someone who transforms inventions and discoveries into commercially viable processes. Baumol (1986, 1988) and Holmes and Schmitz (1990) focus on the entrepreneur's role in adapting new technology to create new products.
Our theory of the entrepreneur differs from previous theories in one important aspect: we view the entrepreneur as an organizer of production who transforms a specific, non-tradable capital into a general, tradable capital.
The entrepreneur is an agent who possesses human capital in the form of specific skills or talents. When she starts a firm, her human capital is essential to the firm. If there were no information or incentive problems then she could write a contract that would result in her supplying her human capital fully and the firm's value would be close to her private value. 4 However, since human capital cannot be sold or, in many instances, efficiently contracted over, the actual value is substantially lower than her private value. The entrepreneur solves this problem by transforming her human capital into what we call "organization capital." The organization capital can be sold as part of the firm, so that the dynamic process of transforming human capital into organization capital means that the value of the firm increases over time. By The process of using human capital to create organization capital is the focus of our analysis. We define organization capital to be information, specific to the firm, which allows the firm to transform technological know-how and factors of production into products and services it can sell in the market. The organization capital is thus embodied in the firm and has value.
The dynamic optimization problem faced by the entrepreneur is as follows.
The entrepreneur's time weighted by her human capital is used directly in the production process to produce output and is also used to produce organization capital. Organization capital is an imperfect substitute for human capital in the production process. The entrepreneur must, therefore, decide how much time to devote to current production, how much to devote to building organization capital which earns a return in the future and how much leisure to consume. Given the leisure-work decision, the entrepreneur trades off creating more organization capital now, which means that the firm has substantial value sooner, against using that human capital for current production, which generates income in the current period. The solution to this dynamic optimization problem pins down the evolution of organization capital over time and the rate at which the value of the firm grows. As the firm evolves over time, the entrepreneur transforms her human capital, a specific, non-tradable asset, into a general asset that is tradable in the market.
We develop and solve a very simple model of the evolution of the firm which yields a number of results. First, we show that the entrepreneur devotes a lot of time in the initial stages to creating organization capital but decreases her time as the firm evolves. We show that the stock of organization capital increases at a decreasing rate. Finally, we show that the value of the firm (the value without the entrepreneur) increases over time, gets closer to entrepreneur's value, but is always below the entrepreneur's value (which includes the entrepreneur's efforts to increase organization capital.)
Our idea of organization capital as accumulated knowledge embodied in the firm, is similar to the type of capital considered by Marshall (1930) . In related work, Rosen (1972) and, more recently, Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) develop models in which the firm produces organization capital and output as a bundle. In contrast, in our model there is a trade-off -the entrepreneur has to divide her time between production of output and creation of organization capital. In Prescott and Visscher (1980), the organization capital is embodied in the firm's workers. In such models, the difference between the value of the firm to the entrepreneur and others is likely to be small. In our model, the organization capital is embodied in the firm and hence, the difference between the value of the firm to the entrepreneur and to outsiders depends upon how important the entrepreneur is to the future of the firm.
Model
This is a model of one firm in a competitive market. An entrepreneur produces a product and sells it at a fixed price. For convenience we assume that this price is one. The entrepreneur hires labor, l, on the spot market at a wage w and produces output using her human capital, h, and organization capital, k, along with the labor. The human capital is relatively specific on several dimensions; it may be specific to the product being produced, the location where it is produced, etc. The organization capital is an imperfect substitute for human capital in the production process.
Define τ p t to be the fraction of time the entrepreneur devotes to the production process in period t. Profit at time t, x t , is then given by
where F (·) is increasing, strictly concave, and homogeneous of degree one. We have assumed that the entrepreneur's human capital h and the market wage w are constant over time.
The entrepreneur is also responsible for creating organization capital. The entrepreneur spends τ k t of her time producing organization capital. The stock of organization capital depends on how much time the entrepreneur devotes to creating it as well as how much is carried over from previous period. The following equation describes the evolution of the stock of organization capital:
Loosely speaking, h represents the specific human capital that is essential to start the firm. In this case, h may represent knowledge of how to convert a blueprint into a new commercial product. Without h there is no product to produce. While knowledge of computer hardware, programming, networks etc. is a tradeable asset, knowledge of how to transform this into a marketable product is not. The entrepreneur not only performs this transformation, but also converts the specific human capital into a tradeable asset. She does so by making herself gradually inessential over time. In this process, she faces an intertemporal trade-off: her current consumption is enhanced by devoting more time to the production process but her future consumption will be enhanced if she devotes more time to creating organization capital.
The entrepreneur maximizes the sum of discounted utility over profits and leisure. We normalize the total amount of time available in a period to be one. Assume that the entrepreneur's utility function is logarithmic and that her subjective discount factor is β. Her problem is to choose τ p , τ k and l
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Notice that her problem does not explicitly depend on the time period once we know the beginning-of-period stock of organization capital. This helps us cast her infinite horizon optimization problem as the following dynamic program:
where V (k) is the (endogenous) value of the entrepreneur's objective when she currently has k units of organization capital, τ p ,τ k and l are current choices of the entrepreneur's time for production, time for organization capital accumulation and labor, and k is the next period's chosen level of organization capital.
It is easy to show that there exists a unique function V (·) that solves the above Bellman's functional equation (see Alvarez and Stokey ( 1998) ).
Furthermore, V (·) is increasing, concave, and differentiable. These properties of V (·) imply that the choice variables τ p , τ k , l, and k are all stationary functions of k i.e., while the values of τ , l, and k change over time, the function describing the values does not.
The first order conditions are
The Envelope Theorem implies that
Combining equations (2) and (4) gives us
Thus, equations (1), (3) and (5) describe the economy.
Value of organization capital
Since we emphasize the role of the entrepreneur as one of transforming specific non-tradable human capital into tradable organization capital, it would be interesting to know the valuation of the enterprise with and without the entrepreneur. Our model suggests that the discounted sum of utilities is the value of the enterprise to the entrepreneur. The value to the entrepreneur with
We can also compute the discounted sum of utilities without the entrepreneur's time but with the organization capital; this we call the value of the firm without the entrepreneur or the value of the firm. To compute the value at any point in time, we set the level of organization capital equal to the entrepreneur's chosen level at the time and then calculate the discounted sum of utilities. Since, h = 0, k t+1 = g(k t , 0) and
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The value of a firm with k units of organization capital but without the entrepreneur's human capital would be
We next calibrate the model to see how it behaves and do some simple comparative static exercises.
Calibration
We adopt a particular functional form for the production function and law of motion of organization capital.
Given these functional forms, equations (1), (3) and (5) become
We next use these equations to compute a numerical solution to the model.
We have a number of technology parameters:
µ-ratio of investment in organization capital to the stock of organization The calibration strategy is the following. We first fix the level parameters h, Z, and w. The levels of these are arbitrary so we set h = 3, Z = 3 and w = 1.
β is set to a standard value, 0.96 which typically implies a real interest rate of 4%. We set ρ = 0.95. This means that investment in organization capital is a close substitute for existing organization capital. We use the "Survey of Private Enterprise" to compute the value of profit-output ratio, α = 0.732.
Output is defined to be net profit + wage payments. We calculate the profitoutput ratio of manufacturing, wholesale, retail, and service industries from 1980 to 2005 in Japan. Using GDP share, we take the weighted average of these industries in each year and then take the average over the entire sample period.
Finally, we determine φ and µ. We jointly calibrate these two parameters to match the steady state hours worked and steady state investment to capital ratio. We calculate the steady state hours worked as follows. Since we have normalized the time available to the entrepreneur as 1, we take the average weekly hours worked in Japan during 1980-2005 and divide by 112 (16 hours each day times seven days). The fraction is 0.368. 
Benchmark Results
Next, using the approximated value function and policy functions, we simu- For the first few periods, an entrepreneur devotes more than 50% of her time endowment for work (production + organization capital formation). As Figure 2 shows, she spends 58% of her time for work in the second pe- In the benchmark case, the entrepreneur stops working at production activities after two periods. Furthermore, time for capital accumulation is concave. When the level of organization capital is low, the entrepreneur needs to work. However, once she reaches a certain level of organization capital, she stops working on production and also begins to reduce the time spent on organization capital formation. Figure 5 shows that the value to the entrepreneur as well as the value of the firm without the entrepreneur increases over time.
The gap between the values narrows, but it does not seem to converge to zero. 
Concluding Comments
In developing a theory of start-up firms or entrepreneurship we focus on the role of organization capital. The entrepreneur is able to transform her human capital into a marketable asset, which we call organization capital, by building an effective business organization, thereby making herself inessential over time. This organization capital can be used by the entrepreneur to generate future streams of profits and create value.
Our view is that organization capital plays an important role in determining the value of a firm. When firms are sold the price the firm sells for reflects future profitability. But what is it that the buyer is actually buying? Our view is that besides the physical assets when you buy a business you are in large part purchasing the organization capital.
Our model implies that the firm increases organization capital at a decreasing rate. Labor demand by the firm (and profits) also increases at a decreasing rate. This means that the value of a firm increases at a decreasing rate.
We think this framework will be useful in analyzing the behavior of multinational firms. For example, consider a multinational firm that wants to take advantage of cheap inputs available in another country. It could choose to operate a plant in that country, enter into a joint venture with a local firm or contract out to a local firm. Our model suggests that their choice of mode of entry into this market will be affected by the way organization capital is created by the multinational firm.
There are many important issues that we have not dealt with at this point, such as the extent to which organization capital is embodied in people, whether organization capital can be purchased and transferred to other uses and to what extent organization capital is a public good. We leave these issues for future research.
[ According to his survey, the average number of hours worked in a week is 66. About 87% of the entrepreneurs in the sample work more than 41 hours a week, 63% work more than 61 hours a week. This is about 18 hours longer than the average weekly working hours of full-time employees. The average business length in the sample is 14.8 months. Thus, the sample is restricted to fairly new entrepreneurs.
The report shows that a new entrepreneur works 10.4 hours a day on average. About 15% of the entrepreneurs in the sample work more than 13 hours a day. Entrepreneurs working less than 6 hours a day are only 4.2% of the sample. Furthermore, the number of holidays taken in a month is 4.3 on average. This means that the new entrepreneurs work 6 days a week. Using these facts, the average weekly hours worked would be about 62.4 hours which is pretty close to the results in Harada (2003) . 10 Therefore, we could say that a typical entrepreneur in Japan works much longer than other types of workers when her business is in early stage.
There is another interesting feature in the statistics of entrepreneurs' holidays. About 11 percent of the sample do not take holidays at all. The share of an entrepreneur who takes less than three days in a month is 23.5%. About a quarter of a new entrepreneurs work 7 days a week at some points during a month. This tells us that entrepreneurs' time endowment could be very different from the usual employees' one. 
